The Italian Offensive into Egypt
Originally planned to coincide with the expected German invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion), Mussolini’s ambition to seize the Suez Canal and disrupt British imperial communications encouraged him to order Marshal Rodolfo Graziani’s Italian 10th Army to proceed with the planned offensive (Operazione E) into Egypt from Cyrenaica following the postponement of Sea Lion.
Despite the size of the 10th Army, numbering around 200,000 men, it suffered from severe shortages of vehicles caused by previous campaigns in Ethiopia and Spain, and had to be reinforced by cannibalising units from the 5th Army, which was covering the inactive Libyan–Tunisian frontier to the west. This enabled the Italians to assemble around 2,500 motor vehicles and approximately 70 M11/39 medium tanks for the offensive.
As the 10th Army advanced eastward across the Egyptian border from Cyrenaica, the main thrust was led by the XXIII Corps under General Annibale Bergonzoli, consisting of the 62nd “Marmarica” Infantry Division and the 63rd “Cirene” Infantry Division, together with the Libyan Corps under General Sebastiano Gallina, comprising the 1st and 2nd Libyan Divisions. While these formations advanced along the coast road, the Maletti Group — a mixed force of motorised infantry and tank battalions — was tasked with outflanking the British to the south. Together, these formations fielded approximately 600 tanks and 1,600 artillery pieces, supported by around 330 aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica. In reserve behind them were the XXI and XXII Corps, including the 61st “Sirte”, 64th “Catanzaro”, and 4th Blackshirt Divisions.
Facing them was Major-General Richard O’Connor’s much smaller but highly trained and mobile Western Desert Force, numbering approximately 36,000 men, 275 tanks, and 120 artillery pieces. The force was built around the 7th Armoured Division (“Desert Rats”), the 4th Indian Infantry Division, and screening patrols from the 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own), with the 4th and 7th Royal Horse Artillery and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment held in reserve. They were supported by 142 aircraft of the RAF.
Rather than meeting the Italians in a head-on battle, the British utilised their superior mobility to conduct a disciplined fighting withdrawal. Using armoured cars and mobile patrols to carry out delaying actions while avoiding decisive engagement, British forces continually reported Italian movements as they withdrew towards prepared defensive positions nearer Mersa Matruh. The slow and cautious pace of the Italian advance allowed British commanders to preserve their limited strength while gathering vital intelligence on Graziani’s ultimate intentions.